The workshop included over 40 participants (many of them IMD affiliates) and featured thirteen talks in voting, districting, proportional representation, and other topics. Time was also set aside for collaborative work in small groups and development of new research projects.

IMD is grateful to all who shared their expertise and participated in making the workshop a success!

The post IMD Affiliate-Organized Workshop Recap: “Mathematics of Elections, Fairness, and Representation” at the Banff International Research Station appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The talk covered how mathematics has been quietly shaping democracy for centuries, from the design of voting systems to the drawing of political maps. Today, with classical results being repurposed in surprising ways and vast computational power at our disposal, it offers powerful new tools for understanding and improving how we govern ourselves. Volić traced the historical role of mathematics in democracy and surveyed current research at their intersection, spanning voting theory, districting, apportionment, proportional representation, and digital democracy. Far from being merely abstract or theoretical, this vibrant interdisciplinary work demonstrates how mathematical expertise speaks directly to the functioning of democratic institutions – challenging the notion that our work has little bearing on civic life. The talk highlighted how mathematical formality can be meaningfully integrated with human realities of politics, a task that feels especially urgent as democracy faces profound strain.

To watch the recording, visit the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hm_nBJ_xpAQ 

The post IMD Co-Founder Ismar Volić Gives Talk at the JMM: “Math goes to Washington: The Mathematics of Democracy, from Theory to Practice” appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

See the abstract and link to the publication below:

“This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in “Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?”. Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from the Cooperative Election Survey (CES) to examine how instant-runoff voting (IRV) and Condorcet methods promote candidate moderation. Their model assumes an idealized electoral environment in which all voters possess complete information regarding candidates’ ideological positions, all voters provide complete preference rankings, etc. Under these assumptions, their results indicate that Condorcet methods tend to yield winners who are substantially more moderate than those produced by IRV. We construct new models based on CES data which take into account more realistic voter behavior,

such as the presence of partial ballots. Our general finding is that under more realistic models the differences between Condorcet methods and IRV largely disappear, implying that in real-world settings the moderating effect of Condorcet methods may not be nearly as strong as what is suggested by more theoretical models.”

Candidate Moderation Under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Survey

The post IMD Team Releases Paper Titled “Candidate Moderation Under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Survey” appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The virtual program runs from the end of June through the beginning of August. Faculty commitment is a few hours per week, working with a group of three or four high school students. IMD can also provide undergraduate teaching assistants. Faculty will receive stipends for their participation.

Projects can be theoretical or empirical, and many involve analysis of real-life data. Some of the past projects include the study of properties of voting methods, the influence of court decisions on measures of gerrymandering, modeling proportional representation in the U.S., and analyzing the effect of alternative sizes and apportionments of House of Representatives on presidential elections. 

If you are interested in being a faculty mentor for this program or to learn more about it, please email us at contact@math-democracy.org.

We look forward to working with you to support student engagement with mathematics and democracy!

The post Seeking Faculty Mentors for 2026 High School Summer Research Program appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

In addition, Prof. Veomett has two articles that were recently published on gerrymandering metrics:  Bounds and Bugs: The Limits of Symmetry Metrics to Detect Partisan Gerrymandering and Don’t Trust a Single Gerrymandering Metric.  The Redistricting Data Hub recently asked her to present this work to their stakeholders (which includes staff from the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Southern Poverty Law Center, and other prominent civil rights organizations). 

The post New Gerrychain Data Resource Available appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The post IMD Affiliate and Summer Research Students Complete Paper on “Bloc Voting on Single-Peaked Preferences” appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The post Ranked Choice Voting in Wellesley College Government Elections appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

RSVP Here: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdwOA5hTPQ0oXQDCeygaQBKfoRP8f2xz-yDda9J23-dxP2Mxw/viewform

The post IMD Affiliate Talk: The Role of CS and Math in Redistricting and Proportional Multimember Districts as an Electoral Reform appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

Find out more about the program here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/162xqjHqKQMvoRQ6qEdgm2fSnneQaSeuB/view?usp=drive_link

The post Electoral Innovation Lab: 2026 Summer Fellowship Program appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The purpose of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SSCW) is “to promote the advancement of knowledge in social choice and welfare economics, broadly defined, and to facilitate communication among researchers from numerous disciplines working on social choice and welfare economics.” The meeting will take place from June 13 to June 16, 2026 and is organized by the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo. 

To learn more and register, visit their website: https://sites.google.com/view/sscw2026?usp=sharing. 

The post IMD Affiliate Delivering Condorcet Lecture at SSCW2026 appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.