Brian Brubach is an Assistant Professor of computer science at Wellesley College. His research focuses on algorithms and theoretical computer science with broad applications in areas such as e-commerce, fairness in automated systems, bioinformatics, and the U.S. electoral system. This is his project description:

“This project will explore measures of how close a set of ranked ballots is to being single-peaked on a line or other graph structure. We will analyze both real and synthetic election data to (1) discover characteristics of real elections, (2) identify patterns indicating electoral anomalies, and (3) check for differences between datasets using different voting rules.”

Mostapha Diss is an Affiliated Professor at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University. He is also a Full Professor of Economics at the University of Franche-Comté in France and a member of the CRESE research center since 2019. His research has focused on microeconomic theory, particularly game theory and social choice theory. This is his project description:

“The objective of this project is to analyze inequalities within the German political system using longitudinal data from the Politbarometer surveys (GESIS), which provide repeated series of public opinion data since 1977. We will develop inequality measures adapted to ordinal preferences derived from these surveys, enabling the assessment of concentration or polarization in political satisfaction rankings across socio-demographic groups, regions, and time periods. This approach will reveal the temporal dynamics of disparities in the representation of collective preferences.”

Natasa Dragovic (University of Saint Thomas) is interested in the intersection of probability and dynamical systems. Her research involves using mathematical models of opinion dynamics to make sense of political phenomena. This is her project description:

“We will explore ranked choice elections in Minneapolis and Saint Paul and look for anomalies.” 

Matt Jones is an assistant professor of Mathematics at Colby College. In the area of mathematics and democracy, his research involves studying the properties of various voting methods using mathematical analysis and computation. This is his project description:

“We will be studying ballot generator models, e.g. impartial culture, Bradley-Terry, Plackett-Luce, spatial models, and compare their outputs to real ranked ballot data. Relevant questions include: What are the statistical markers of “realistic” profiles? What models most closely resemble real elections? How can we modify existing models to account for truncated ballots?”

David McCune received his PhD in geometric group theory and semigroup theory from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2011. He is currently an Associate Professor of Mathematics in the Department of Mathematics and Data Science at William Jewell College. His research interests include apportionment theory and social choice theory, with an emphasis on the computational and empirical aspects of these fields. This is his project description:

“We will study spoiler effects in multiwinner elections where the spoiler candidate is particularly “weak” in some way. How often could a Pareto-dominated candidate be a spoiler for the method of single transferable vote, for example? This project is useful because the spoiler effect is seen as particularly egregious when the spoiler candidate is weak, and Pareto-dominated candidates are weak. We will explore this topic for several different notions of weak candidates, using the Scottish and Australian STV datasets as the main playground.”

Keaton Quinn (Wellesley College) is interested in the geometry of districting. His group will look into multi-winner districts and proportional representation. This is his project description:

“It is claimed that multi-winner districts increase the likelihood that the demographics of those elected more accurately represent the demographics of the voting population. We will investigate these claims using the Markov chain methods that appear in the literature. Do multimember districts always lead to proportional representation? Does it depend on the size of the POC population? Does it depend on the level, size, or location of the election? ”

Andrew Schultz is an Assistant Professor of Mathematics at Wellesley College. Previously, he was a J.L. Doob Professor of Mathematics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He finished his Ph.D. under the direction of Ravi Vakil at Stanford in 2007. His basic research interests are algebraic, though more specifically he’s interested in Galois module structures of ‘interesting’ objects and Hilbert 90-like results. This is his project description:

“Spatial models can be a useful way to understand how voter ideology translates into outcomes for different election types. In this project we use CES data to model elections that first run through a primary selection process before resulting in a general election. What effect does this have on the distance of the elected candidate from the median voter? How might parties act strategically to insert an independent moderate candidate to siphon of votes from their competitor? And how might incumbency or party support be factored into the model to explain persistence or favored status?”

Kristopher Tapp is a Professor in the Department of Mathematics at Saint Joseph’s University. His research areas include Riemannian Geometry, graph algorithms, and combinatorics.  His recent work focuses on applying mathematics to redistricting and election analysis. This is his project description:

“We will study the distribution of ballot lengths in Scottish and other ranked choice elections. How does it depend on the number of candidates and seats? On the number of candidates in one’s preferred party? On the clustering of a profile into blocs of voters? How frequently is it the case that blocs of voters could have obtained a more desirable outcome by extending or shortening their ballots? With respect to which social choice mechanism (STV, Borda, etc) is the outcome most affected by the ballot length distribution?”

Jennifer Wilson is an Associate Professor of Mathematics at The New School.  Her research interests include voting and social choice theory, systems of political representation, resource allocation and cooperative game theory. She has also developed courses in Gerrymandering and Fair Representation, and Fair Division and Politics. This is her project description:

“We will work on one of two projects depending on student background and preferences. The first is to look at the behavior of mult-winner voting methods for a small number of candidates on single-crossing domains. The second is to compare the results by party of the Scottish elections and the results of using a standard apportionment method.”

The undergraduate teaching assistants for this year’s program are Valerie Zhu, Elaine Zhao, Gahan Sabbir, and Erik Hill.

Thank you to all of the mentors and teaching assistants for their integral roles in the program. We look forward to seeing the work their teams will do this summer. Stay tuned for more research updates!

The post IMD High School Summer Research Program Project Descriptions appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The workshop included over 40 participants (many of them IMD affiliates) and featured thirteen talks in voting, districting, proportional representation, and other topics. Time was also set aside for collaborative work in small groups and development of new research projects.

IMD is grateful to all who shared their expertise and participated in making the workshop a success!

The post IMD Affiliate-Organized Workshop Recap: “Mathematics of Elections, Fairness, and Representation” at the Banff International Research Station appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

See the abstract and link to the publication below:

“This article extends the analysis of Atkinson, Foley, and Ganz in “Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked-Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?”. Their work uses a one-dimensional spatial model based on survey data from the Cooperative Election Survey (CES) to examine how instant-runoff voting (IRV) and Condorcet methods promote candidate moderation. Their model assumes an idealized electoral environment in which all voters possess complete information regarding candidates’ ideological positions, all voters provide complete preference rankings, etc. Under these assumptions, their results indicate that Condorcet methods tend to yield winners who are substantially more moderate than those produced by IRV. We construct new models based on CES data which take into account more realistic voter behavior,

such as the presence of partial ballots. Our general finding is that under more realistic models the differences between Condorcet methods and IRV largely disappear, implying that in real-world settings the moderating effect of Condorcet methods may not be nearly as strong as what is suggested by more theoretical models.”

Candidate Moderation Under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Survey

The post IMD Team Releases Paper Titled “Candidate Moderation Under Instant Runoff and Condorcet Voting: Evidence from the Cooperative Election Survey” appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The virtual program runs from the end of June through the beginning of August. Faculty commitment is a few hours per week, working with a group of three or four high school students. IMD can also provide undergraduate teaching assistants. Faculty will receive stipends for their participation.

Projects can be theoretical or empirical, and many involve analysis of real-life data. Some of the past projects include the study of properties of voting methods, the influence of court decisions on measures of gerrymandering, modeling proportional representation in the U.S., and analyzing the effect of alternative sizes and apportionments of House of Representatives on presidential elections. 

If you are interested in being a faculty mentor for this program or to learn more about it, please email us at contact@math-democracy.org.

We look forward to working with you to support student engagement with mathematics and democracy!

The post Seeking Faculty Mentors for 2026 High School Summer Research Program appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

In addition, Prof. Veomett has two articles that were recently published on gerrymandering metrics:  Bounds and Bugs: The Limits of Symmetry Metrics to Detect Partisan Gerrymandering and Don’t Trust a Single Gerrymandering Metric.  The Redistricting Data Hub recently asked her to present this work to their stakeholders (which includes staff from the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Southern Poverty Law Center, and other prominent civil rights organizations). 

The post New Gerrychain Data Resource Available appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The post IMD Affiliate and Summer Research Students Complete Paper on “Bloc Voting on Single-Peaked Preferences” appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The post Ranked Choice Voting in Wellesley College Government Elections appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

RSVP Here: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdwOA5hTPQ0oXQDCeygaQBKfoRP8f2xz-yDda9J23-dxP2Mxw/viewform

The post IMD Affiliate Talk: The Role of CS and Math in Redistricting and Proportional Multimember Districts as an Electoral Reform appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

Find out more about the program here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/162xqjHqKQMvoRQ6qEdgm2fSnneQaSeuB/view?usp=drive_link

The post Electoral Innovation Lab: 2026 Summer Fellowship Program appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.

The purpose of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (SSCW) is “to promote the advancement of knowledge in social choice and welfare economics, broadly defined, and to facilitate communication among researchers from numerous disciplines working on social choice and welfare economics.” The meeting will take place from June 13 to June 16, 2026 and is organized by the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo. 

To learn more and register, visit their website: https://sites.google.com/view/sscw2026?usp=sharing. 

The post IMD Affiliate Delivering Condorcet Lecture at SSCW2026 appeared first on Institute for Mathematics and Democracy.