


Voting Methods: Why They Matter

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
The Institute for Mathematics and Democracy

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Majority Vote




- ☐ Two candidates
- ☐ A wins



- ☐ Three candidates
- ☐ A still wins

Plurality Vote




- ☐ There is no majority winner
- ☐ A has the most votes, so A wins
- ☐ But 74% of voters didn't have A as their first choice


Problem: Vote Splitting

- ❑ Trump won a plurality of the popular vote
- ❑ Polls indicate that voters preferred Rubio or Cruz over Trump in one-on-one contests

2016 Republican Party presidential primaries popular vote



Another Example

	Candidate	Party	Votes	Pct.
	✓ Paul LePage	Rep.	218,065	38.2%
	Eliot Cutler	Ind.	208,270	36.5%
	Libby Mitchell	Dem.	109,387	19.2%
	Shawn Moody	Ind.	28,756	5.0%
	Kevin Scott	Ind.	5,664	1.0%

2010 Maine Gubernatorial Elections

Ranked Choice Voting

Ranked Choice Voting

20	18	10	2
A	D	B	A
B	B	C	C
D	C	D	D
C	A	A	B

- ❑ Voters rank candidates in order of preference
- ❑ A has the most first place votes at 22, so A wins the plurality vote.
- ❑ Need 25 to be a majority winner
- ❑ How to decide the winner?
 - ❑ Instant runoff
 - ❑ Borda count
 - ❑ Many other methods

Ranked Choice Voting - Instant Runoff

- ❑ Eliminate candidates by removing the one with the fewest first place votes
- ❑ Repeat the process until there is a majority winner

20	18	10	2
A	D	B	A
B	B	C	C
D	C	D	D
C	A	A	B



20	18	10	2
A	D	B	A
B	B	D	D
D	A	A	B



20	18	10	2
A	D	D	A
D	A	A	D

- ❑ A was the plurality winner, but D wins the instant runoff

Ranked Choice Voting - Borda count

- Have each ranking of a candidate be worth a certain number of points - with n candidates, first place is worth $n-1$ points, second is worth $n-2$ points, and so on
- In this case (four candidates), first place is worth 3 points, second is worth 2, third is worth 1, and last is worth 0.

	20	18	10	2
A	A	D	B	A
B	B	B	C	C
D	D	C	D	D
C	C	A	A	B

- A's score: $20*3 + 18*0 + 10*0 + 2*3 = 66$
- B's score: $20*2 + 18*2 + 10*3 + 2*0 = 106$
- C's score: $20*0 + 18*1 + 10*2 + 2*2 = 42$
- D's score: $20*1 + 18*3 + 10*1 + 2*1 = 86$
- B is the Borda count winner.

Results of Different Voting Methods

20	18	10	2
A	D	B	A
B	B	C	C
D	C	D	D
C	A	A	B

- No majority winner
- A is the plurality winner
- D is the instant runoff winner
- B is the Borda count winner
- Who should be the real winner?

What Makes a Good Voting System?

Majority Rule

- ❑ A voting system should try to be consistent with the principle of majority rule
- ❑ How do the voting systems we've discussed deal with this?
 - ❑ **Plurality voting** seems like a simple extension of majority voting, but does not adequately capture voter preferences.
 - ❑ **Borda count** does not take majority rule into account
 - ❑ **Instant runoff** is built with the goal of producing a majority winner
- ❑ Though there are many ways to implement ranked choice voting, instant runoff is appealing because reflects the idea of majority rule

More Properties for a Good Voting System

- ❑ Some Definitions:
 - ❑ **Pareto Criterion:** If everyone prefers candidate A to candidate B, candidate B cannot win.
 - ❑ **Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):** If the voters as a group prefer A to B, and some voters change the rankings of other candidates but leave A and B alone, it should not change the relative ranking of A and B.
- ❑ **Arrow's Impossibility Theorem:** Any ranked choice voting system that satisfies the Pareto Criterion and IIA is a dictatorship.
- ❑ Does this mean ranked choice voting is bad?

Final Takeaways

- ❑ Plurality voting: Easy to understand, but does not adequately represent voter preferences
- ❑ Ranked choice voting offers more freedom to voters and better reflects group preferences
- ❑ Though we currently use plurality voting, change is possible!
 - ❑ Ranked choice voting is **on the ballot today** in Massachusetts and Alaska!
 - ❑ Already used in Maine on a statewide level, and in many cities across the country.



Thank you!